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Abstract: This study investigates public support for two types of EU-wide solidarity that currently 
exist, namely member state solidarity (i.e. transfers to less developed and crisis-hit countries) and 
transnational solidarity (i.e. granting cross-border social rights to EU citizens). Drawing on data from 
the 2014 Belgian National Election Study, we find that opposition towards European integration – in 
particular regarding EU enlargement – reduces citizens’ willingness to support European solidarity to 
a large extent. However, this study reveals that public support for European solidarity cannot simply be 
reduced to a pro-versus anti-integration, nor to a domestic left-right conflict. Citizens’ substantive 
positions towards the EU’s social and economic agenda are a crucial element in understanding 
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The Brexit referendum has forced European policymakers to reflect on the course of the European 
project more than ever. In its white paper on the future of Europe, the European Commission carved 
out five scenarios that differ strongly in the proposed scope of competences for the EU (European 
Commission, 2017c). Very often, debates about the future of the EU are reduced to a choice between 
‘more or less’ Europe. However, this opposition conceals a more fundamental debate on what kind of 
Europe – in terms of its policy and priorities – is preferable. In this regard, the EU has been increasingly 
criticized for being preoccupied exclusively with economic policy, and lacking a strong social 
dimension (Scharpf, 2010). Although some are reluctant about EU interference in social policy, calls 
have been made for a more ‘Social Europe’, with a strengthened focus on social policy-making at the 
EU level (Fernandes and Rubio, 2012; Vandenbroucke, 2013). Advocates of strengthening the EU’s 
social dimension have put forward various arguments. Most notably, EU-level social policy is 
considered necessary to avoid politically undesirable effects of the single market on national welfare 
states, such as the risk of social dumping and a race to the bottom in terms of social standards. Social 
Europe is also deemed to contribute to the long-term sustainability of the Eurozone, as initiatives with 
a social purpose can reduce the risk of asymmetric shocks. In addition to these political and functional 
reasons, intensified engagement in social policy-making is considered a precondition for sustaining 
public support for the European project. These arguments in favour of a Social Europe find a response 
among policymakers. Jean-Claude Juncker’s (2015) call to achieve a ‘social triple A-rating’ – parallel 
to being ‘triple A’ in economic and financial terms – is an example of this. The ‘European Pillar of 
Social Rights’ initiative and the proposal of EU Commissioner Marianne Thyssen to reform the EU 
social security co-ordination law reflect the same ambition. 
Notwithstanding calls for a more ‘Social Europe’, it is important to acknowledge that the EU is already 
involved in social policy making, using various policy instruments such as social regulation, the 
exchange of best practices, and – probably the most contested aspect of Social Europe – the 
redistribution of domestic resources (Falkner, 2016). Currently, redistribution at the EU level is based 




between countries, and (2) transnational solidarity, granting cross-border welfare rights to EU citizens 
(Sangiovanni, 2013). The salience of both types of European solidarity has increased in the light of the 
recent economic crisis. Financial assistance to debt-ridden member states overturned the no-bailout 
clause, deepening member state solidarity. In addition, high unemployment rates in Southern Europe 
increased the number of mobile EU citizens, which might not only exercise their economic rights, but 
also their welfare rights (Eurofound, 2014). These events bring to the fore questions about the 
legitimacy and the limits of European solidarity. In particular, concerns have been raised about a so-
called ‘Transfer Union’, with permanent transfers to less-developed member states (Fernandes and 
Rubio, 2012) and the financial burden of intra-EU mobility on national welfare states1 (Fóti, 2015). 
In this article, we approach the legitimacy of European redistribution from the perspective of public 
opinion, and investigate the level and roots of popular support for member state and transnational 
solidarity. Specifically, we analyse whether public resistance against European solidarity is simply an 
emanation of Euroscepticism, or rather reflects individuals’ preferences concerning the EU’s social and 
economic agenda. On the one hand, European solidarity strengthens the integration of the member states 
and citizens in the EU by sharing risks and resources. Public resistance to European solidarity can 
therefore be an expression of citizens’ opposition to the principle of European integration in general. 
On the other hand, European solidarity is inherently part of the EU’s social dimension, meaning that 
resistance to European solidarity may be explained by a lack of support for the implementation of a 
social agenda for the EU. To date, few studies have analysed individual differences in the support for 
European solidarity. It remains unclear to what extent support for European solidarity is an expression 
of general support for the EU, or instead ideological preferences concerning the priority of social and 
economic policy for the EU agenda (hereafter referred to as EU agenda preferences). In addition, most 
studies are limited in scope, as they focus either on member state solidarity (Beaudonnet, 2014; Bechtel 
et al., 2014; Daniele and Geys, 2015; Kleider and Stoeckel, 2018; Lengfeld et al., 2015; Stoeckel and 
Kuhn, 2017) or on transnational solidarity (Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2013, 2015; Hjorth, 2015). Potential 
differences in the explanatory mechanisms of these two types of European solidarity remain obscure, 
                                                          




whereas they could provide broader insight into citizens’ understanding of European integration issues. 
To answer these questions, we analyse data from the Belgian National Election Study (BNES) 2014 by 
means of structural equation modelling. 
The two faces of European solidarity 
Historically, the institutionalization of solidarity within national welfare states gave rise to questions 
about the conditionality of solidarity and about who deserves social protection (van Oorschot, 2000). 
The development of EU-level social policy similarly prompted discussions about what principles and 
ideals of solidarity ought to apply between member states and citizens of the EU (Crum, 2011; 
Sangiovanni, 2013). Sangiovanni (2013) rightfully distinguishes national solidarity, member state 
solidarity and transnational solidarity as different logics of solidarity in the EU. As we are interested in 
practices of European solidarity, we focus on the latter two types. Member state solidarity, also labelled 
‘international solidarity’ (Ciornei and Recchi, 2017), refers to the sharing of social and economic risks 
between EU member states; transnational solidarity entails social and economic risk sharing among 
EU citizens. Practices of both types of European solidarity currently exist in the EU.  
Member state solidarity 
As an integral part of European integration, joint efforts are made to reduce regional disparities and to 
strengthen economic and social cohesion in the EU. The structural and cohesion funds were established 
to support these efforts. Financed by national contributions, they represent about one third of the EU’s 
total budget (European Commission, 2016). The funds are directed towards a diverse set of objectives, 
from upgrading workforce skills to environmental programmes, and thus respond to a number of 
challenges for which member states share responsibilities (Allen, 2010). This policy instrument entails 
an important element of redistribution that is founded on the logic of member state solidarity, as the 
richest EU countries are net contributors and less-developed countries net recipients (European 
Commission, 2016). The Cohesion Fund, for instance, exclusively provides resources to member states 




The European debt crisis has revived the debate about redistribution between EU member states. In a 
short space of time, a new permanent bailout fund for the Eurozone led to a deepening of member state 
solidarity. The established European Stability Mechanism obliges member states to contribute to a joint 
budget, from which countries facing severe financial difficulties can borrow. It has been argued that 
member state solidarity is not only needed to get out of the crisis, but will also contribute to the smooth 
functioning of the monetary union in the long term (Fernandes and Rubio, 2012). Others have warned 
that financial transfers are solely legitimate in exceptional circumstances, as they can lead to public 
opposition both in donor countries, based on concerns that the loans will not be paid back, and in 
recipient countries, because of the accompanying austerity measures (Vanhercke et al., 2016).  
Empirical studies indicate that in donor countries such as Germany, public support for financial 
assistance is higher than is often portrayed by the media (Bechtel et al., 2014; Lengfeld and Kroh, 2016). 
The interdependency between member states of the EU seems to be a motivation to support financial 
aid to other member states (Beaudonnet, 2014; Lengfeld et al., 2015). In addition to national economic 
interests, the willingness to support other member states is also guided by considerations of moral duty 
and reciprocity, that is, the expectation that any country might become needy in the future. The finding 
that Germans are more willing to provide financial help to EU than to non-EU countries (Lengfeld and 
Kroh, 2016) indicates that European integration has created a certain degree of support for member 
state solidarity. 
Transnational solidarity 
EU rules not only have consequences for redistribution between member states, but also have a direct 
impact on the legal rights and obligations of every individual citizen. The co-ordination of social 
security systems (regulations (EC) 883/2004 and 987/2009), which aims to prevent citizens from losing 
their social security rights when moving from one member state to another, for example, establishes 
cross-border solidarity relationships between EU citizens.2 Transnational solidarity is mainly 
                                                          





implemented through the principles of non-discrimination, aggregation of periods of insurance, and 
exportability (European Commission, 2010). Most importantly, the principle of non-discrimination 
implies that mobile EU citizens have the same rights and obligations as nationals of the member state 
where they reside. This means that social benefits and services can no longer be reserved only for 
nationals. When benefits are conditional on the completion of particular periods of insurance, 
employment or residence, EU co-ordination rules ensures that periods under the legislation of other 
member states are taken into account. The use of social benefits can also not be limited to a member 
state’s own territory. Due to the exportability principle, family benefits are also paid to entitled mobile 
EU citizens whose child is living in another member state.  
European social citizenship is crucial to establish solidarity between Europeans. As Ferrera (2005) 
states, the process of European integration has redrawn the boundaries of social citizenship and has 
attempted to restructure it at the European level. Given that about 16 million Europeans live and work 
in another member state (European Commission, 2017b), its scope and impact are significant. However, 
intra-EU movement is not equally spread across Europe: 98 per cent of mobile workers live in EU15 or 
EFTA countries, while only 2 per cent reside in the EU13 (European Commission, 2017a). Currently, 
transnational solidarity only comes into force when citizens exercise their right of free movement, 
although the extension of transnational solidarity has already been proposed in the form of a European 
unemployment insurance scheme, a European child benefit and a European minimum income benefit 
(Dullien, 2012; Levy et al., 2013; Peña-Casas and Denis, 2014). 
The opening of the boundaries of long-standing national solidarity systems to EU citizens remains a 
sensitive issue for member states as well as for their citizens. Empirical research among Swedish 
citizens shows that the recipient’s identity plays a decisive role in the willingness to grant social benefits 
to EU migrants (Hjorth, 2015). More specifically, cues about being Bulgarian as opposed to Dutch, 
decrease Swedish citizens’ willingness to grant access to child benefits. These findings can be linked to 
recent EU enlargement, which triggered concerns about Eastern Europeans constituting a financial 
burden on welfare arrangements (Fóti, 2015). Very often, the costs of mobile EU citizens for public 




et al., 2014). Although there is no empirical evidence for the welfare magnetism hypothesis – that 
international differences in the generosity of welfare systems trigger intra-EU migration flows (Giulietti 
and Kahanec, 2013) – public support for cross-border welfare rights is shown to be cost sensitive. When 
citizens are faced with potential cuts in the level of benefits, they are less willing to grant EU citizens 
access to their national social security system (Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2015).  
Explaining European solidarity: Euroscepticism and EU agenda preferences 
A variety of theoretical approaches ─ including self-interest, identity, and individual transnationalism  
(Bechtel et al., 2014; Berg, 2007; Ciornei and Recchi, 2017; Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2015; Kuhn et al., 
2017) ─ have been put forward to explain citizens’ attitudes to European solidarity. We focus on the 
role of Euroscepticism and EU agenda preferences as two factors that received only little attention in 
previous research.  
Although attitudes towards European integration are often conceptualized as embedded into a wider 
cultural integration-demarcation conflict (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2008), the international relations model 
states that contestation of European integration issues is structured along a single dimension of pro-
integration versus anti-integration. Accordingly, public opposition to European solidarity would be a 
direct reflection of Euroscepticism: a negative attitude towards European integration or the European 
Union in general (Krouwel and Abts, 2007). Concretely, deepening and widening are the two basic 
processes that underlie the integration into ‘an ever-closer union’ (Fraser, 2004). Deepening refers to 
the transfer of decision-making powers to the supranational level. In a variety of policy areas, the EU 
has acquired exclusive, shared and supporting competences as defined in the EU treaties. Widening 
refers to the geographical enlargement of the EU. Although doubts have been raised about the capacity 
of the EU to absorb further members (Vobruba et al., 2003), the process of enlargement is likely to 
continue, as several candidate countries are negotiating to gain EU membership. Citizens’ attitudes 
towards the processes of widening and deepening are not necessarily complementary (Hobolt, 2014; 




because the EU might lose strength with more countries included, as decision-making would become 
more difficult.  
Both deepening and widening have an impact on solidarity patterns in terms of what resources and risks 
are shared, and with whom. For instance, the EU used its acquired competences to coordinate national 
social security systems, granting social rights to EU mobile citizens. Continued deepening can further 
strengthen European solidarity ties. The proposed European unemployment insurance (Dullien, 2012) 
would namely redistribute resources across the entire EU (or EMU) labour force, as it is not only 
targeted at mobile citizens. In addition, enlargements have clear consequences for the boundaries of 
solidarity. Opening the door to new (poorer) member states inevitably influences the balance of old 
member states’ financial contributions and incoming subsidies from the EU (European Commission, 
2016), creating opportunities to express solidarity with new member states and their citizens. In sum, 
EU membership entails a certain degree of member state and transnational solidarity by means of 
processes of both deepening and widening. Put differently, European solidarity is a way to establish the 
further integration of citizens and member states within the EU.  Consequently, it can be expected that 
support for both practices of European solidarity is in the first place informed by citizens’ stance on 
European integration: those who oppose the very idea and principles of European integration are less 
willing to share resources and risks with other EU member states or citizens. Previous empirical 
research shows that anti-integration attitudes are important predictors of support for member state 
solidarity (Kleider and Stoeckel, 2018; Kuhn et al., 2017). These arguments lead to the following 
hypotheses: 
H1: Citizens are less supportive of European solidarity if they oppose EU membership. 
H2: Citizens are less supportive of European solidarity if they oppose EU deepening. 
H3: Citizens are less supportive of European solidarity if they oppose EU enlargement. 
 
Others have argued that contestation over European integration cannot be reduced to a single pro-




(Hooghe and Marks, 1999; Tsebelis and Garret, 2000). Accordingly, one can expect that support for 
European solidarity depends not so much on preferences regarding European integration as such, but 
instead articulates citizens’ ideological preferences about the policy direction of the European project. 
Further, as EU competences have become more diverse, citizens have become more sensitive to the 
political agenda of the European Union (van Elsas and van der Brug, 2015). Whereas the European 
project is primarily concerned with economic policy, the EU’s social policy objectives have become 
more prominent over time (Føllesdal et al., 2007). This shift in the EU’s agenda is visible in the 
European Semester, which is the policy co-ordination cycle through which priorities are set for the EU. 
Although initially focussed on monitoring economic developments and preventing economic and 
financial problems, the European Semester has integrated social policy objectives in recent years 
(Vanhercke et al., 2015). For instance, country-specific recommendations put increasing stress on 
ensuring the accessibility and effectiveness of member states’ social security, pension and healthcare 
systems and on fighting poverty and social exclusion. Nevertheless, the course of European integration 
remains highly debated. 
Accordingly, citizens who support EU membership and the principles of European integration might 
still criticize specific aspects of EU policy, such as the EU’s engagement in social policy (Sørensen, 
2007). We argue that the fundamental policy objectives of the European project, namely what kind of 
Europe should be developed, are of crucial importance in understanding attitudes towards solidarity at 
the EU level. Whereas some believe that the EU’s main goal should be to enhance the competitiveness 
of the European economy, others may consider that the EU should be primarily occupied with 
providing, at the supranational level, decent social security to ordinary citizens in times of globalization 
(Isernia and Cotta, 2016). Previous research confirms that citizens have different conceptions of the 
EU’s priorities (Gabel and Anderson, 2004). We hypothesize that those who prioritize social policy are 
more likely to advocate European solidarity practices, because they can be considered as tools to 
implement the EU social agenda. On the other hand, preferences regarding the economic agenda for the 
EU may not be related to support for European solidarity. Moreover, those who would prefer the EU’s 




building. Previous studies have shown that citizens who position themselves on the political left are 
more willing to grant other Europeans access to their social security system (Berg, 2007; Gerhards and 
Lengfeld, 2013, 2015, Vasilopoulou, 2016) and are more willing to provide financial assistance to other 
member states (Beaudonnet, 2014; Daniele and Geys, 2015; Kuhn et al., 2017). However, these studies 
do not tap into EU agenda preferences in particular. In this respect, Beaudonnet (2014) found that 
citizens who consider the development of a European Social Model as a priority are more willing to 
support financial help to other member states in times of crisis. By contrast, prioritizing economic 
objectives has no significant impact on member state solidarity. As we expect EU agenda preferences 
to be important for both transnational and member state solidarity, this reasoning leads to the following 
overarching hypothesis: 
H4: Prioritizing social policy as an important agenda item for the EU is positively related to 
support for European solidarity. 
H5: Prioritizing economic policy as an important agenda item for the EU does not translate 
into higher support for European solidarity. 
Furthermore, we are interested in whether a pro- versus anti-integration dimension explains member 
state and transnational solidarity to the same extent. Although we do not have strong expectations about 
diverging effects, we explore whether both types of European solidarity are equally affected by EU 
agenda preferences and attitudes towards EU membership, deepening and enlargement. For instance, it 
is possible that opposition to EU enlargement has the strongest impact on transnational solidarity, if 
citizens strongly associate enlargements with increasing numbers of EU migrants that can claim welfare 
benefits. The consequences of enlargement for member states solidarity may be perceived less costly, 









To test our hypotheses, we use data from the Belgian National Election Study 2014 (Abts et al, 2015). 
This post-electoral survey was carried out among a register-based probability sample of Belgians 
entitled to vote in the 2014 national elections. On completion of a computer-assisted personal interview 
(response rate 47 per cent (AAPOR, 2016)), respondents were asked to fill out a drop‐off questionnaire, 
containing an extended module on Social Europe. About 74 per cent of the respondents send back the 
completed questionnaire (N=1403).  
Variables 
Support for member state solidarity is measured by means of three agree/disagree statements tapping 
into support for member states in economic difficulties, the amount of tax money being redistributed 
and the continuity of solidarity between EU countries. Responses were recorded using a 5-point scale 
(1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree). In contrast to previous studies, our measurement taps into 
general principles of redistribution between countries, thus capturing support for the logic of the 
structural and cohesion funds rather than the bailout funds. Attitudes to transnational solidarity are 
operationalized by four 5-point Likert-type items on the access of EU citizens to social benefits and 
protection in Belgium. One item concerns equal social rights, two relate to prioritizing nationals and 
one refers to the conditionality of social rights. Confirmatory factor analysis indicates that a 
measurement model with two latent variables fits the data well, as the RMSEA equals .045 and both 
the CFI (.969) and TLI (.950) are sufficiently close to 1. The latent factor of member state solidarity 
correlates at .641 with the latent factor of transnational solidarity, which indicates that these two types 
of attitudes are quite strongly related to each other. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics as well as 
factor loadings for the items measuring both types of European solidarity.   
 





Euroscepticism or general EU support is measured by the three constitutive components, namely 
support for EU membership, deepening and enlargement. First, citizens’ support for EU membership is 
assessed by the item ‘Generally speaking, do you think that Belgium’s membership of the EU is (1) a 
good thing, (2) a bad thing or (3) neither a good nor a bad thing’. Second, the attitude towards deepening 
of the European project is measured by the preferred distribution of competences between the EU and 
the national government: (1) The current competences of the European Union should be reduced, (2) 
The distribution of competences between the EU and national member states should remain more or 
less the same or (3) The current powers of the European Union should be expanded. Third, the attitude 
to enlargement is assessed by an item concerning whether the accession of Eastern European countries 
in the last decade is: (1) a good thing, (2) a bad thing or (3) neither a good nor a bad thing. Because the 
correlation between these three items of Euroscepticism is only moderately strong (Cramer’s V values 
[0-1] between each of the three indicators range from .26 to .40), we treat the three variables as separate 
indicators. 
Prioritising social policy for the EU is operationalized by a latent variable gauging the extent to which 
the European Commission should give priority to the following issues: fighting social inequality, 
fighting poverty, developing strong social protection in all EU countries and enforcing good working 
conditions in all EU countries (answer categories: a very low priority, a low priority, neither a low nor 
a high priority, a high priority or a very high priority). Prioritising economic policy for the EU is 
operationalized by a latent variable measuring support for prioritizing EU-level efforts in ‘fostering 
economic growth’ and ‘creating employment’. CFA shows that these items do indeed measure the 
intended concepts. The measurement model of social and economic priorities has a good fit (Χ²=40.40; 
df=8; CFI=.973; TLI=.950; RMSEA=.054) with five out of six factor loadings larger than .60.3 
Frequency distributions for all items are displayed in Online Appendix. 
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We include various social-structural variables, among which are age, gender (0=male, 1=female) and 
education level (lower-secondary education, upper-secondary education and tertiary education). 
Occupational status is based on the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) class scheme. We use a 
slightly modified six-class version of the EGP scheme, comprising the following classes: service class 
I (higher-level supervisors and administrators), service class II (lower-level supervisors and 
administrators), routine non-manual, self-employed, skilled workers and unskilled workers. Retired 
people are categorized according to their last occupation and respondents who had never been employed 
are included in a separate category. Furthermore, perceived economic insecurity is included. 
Respondents were asked how often they had the following concerns: (1) that your financial worries will 
increase in the coming years, (2) that you will have difficulties in maintaining your socioeconomic 
position and (3) that your children and the coming generation will find things much more difficult. A 
latent variable is constructed of these items (answer categories: never, rarely, sometimes, regularly and 
often).4 Migration background is included as a dummy variable (0=no, 1=yes). Respondents whose 
mother or father did not have Belgian nationality at birth are considered as having a migration 
background. We include citizens’ attachment to Europe, ranging from: not at all attached (1) to strongly 
attached (5). Lastly, because preferences regarding the policy priorities in EU politics are embedded in 
a general ideological position, we take into account left-right self-placement (0-10 scale). The 
correlations between left-right self-placement and the items of prioritizing social or economic policy 
are relatively moderate (Pearson’s correlation coefficients between .06 and .22). An overview of the 
descriptive statistics is given in Online Appendix.  
Statistical modelling 
To test our hypotheses regarding the roots of member state and transnational solidarity, we estimated a 
series of structural equation models (SEMs) using Mplus software version 7.3. The advantage of SEM 
                                                          
improved the model fit significantly and is theoretically justified because both items refer to protecting EU 
citizens.  




over traditional regression modelling is that it allows to estimate latent variables and corrects for 
measurement error in the model. This leads to more accurate representation of constructs and of 
relationships between them. The models were constructed stepwise (that is, adding blocks of variables 
in separate steps), which allow to assess the net explanatory power that Euroscepticism and EU agenda 
preferences add to the models when social-structural predictors, European identity and left-right 
placement are taken into account. A visualization of the final model is shown in Online Appendix. We 
do not observe multicollinearity, as variance inflation factor values of all predictors are lower than 1.7, 
which is well below the recommended maximum of 10 (Meuleman et al., 2015). Results are weighted 
by age, gender and education. Item non-response is addressed using full information maximum 
likelihood estimation (Schafer and Graham, 2002). All reported regression parameters are standardized 
to allow comparison of effect sizes.  
 
Results 
Models 1a and 1b (Table 2) show the effects of social-structural variables on member state and 
transnational solidarity respectively. Remarkably, support for transnational solidarity is more strongly 
affected by socioeconomic indicators (education level, occupation and subjective economic insecurity). 
For instance, the gap between the low educated – traditionally considered as the ‘losers’ from 
globalization (Kriesi et al., 2008) – and the highly educated is larger for transnational solidarity than 
for member state solidarity. This suggests that European solidarity practices trigger feelings of 
competitive threat among lower-educated Belgians and that granting social rights to EU citizens is 
especially perceived as threatening to people’s own social position. Furthermore, transnational 
identities are a facilitating factor for creating European solidarity; citizens with a migration background 
endorse member state solidarity more strongly and identification with Europe enhances solidarity with 
both EU member states and citizens. In line with previous research, right-wing voters are less in favour 
of European solidarity. Together, these variables explain 27.3 per cent of the total variance in member 




The three indicators of Euroscepticism are added in models 2a and 2b. These variables additionally 
explain 19.2 per cent of the variation in member state solidarity, but only 8 per cent of the additional 
variance in transnational solidarity. In line with our expectations (H1-3), the results indicate that 
opposition to EU membership, deepening and enlargement have strong and independent effects on 
support for European solidarity. First, disapproval of one’s country’s EU membership impedes support 
towards both member state solidarity and transnational solidarity. Membership is thus considered as an 
engagement to share risks and resources with the countries and citizens that are part of it. Second, 
rejecting the principle of deepening is an additional brake on citizens’ support for solidarity across the 
EU. Citizens who prefer a status quo for the division of powers or who think that the EU should return 
a large part of its powers to the nation states are less willing to support other member states financially 
or to accept EU citizens as equals by granting them social rights. With regard to transnational solidarity, 
however, differences are less evident (and not always statistically significant). Third, models 2a and 2b 
show that citizens who disapprove of the Eastern enlargements (or have no clear opinion on the matter) 
are significantly less supportive of both member state solidarity and transnational solidarity. Belgian 
citizens thus recognize that the accession of new countries to the EU will expand the circle of solidarity, 
potentially making it more costly. The boundaries of the European community seem to be of extreme 
importance, because opposition towards enlargement even more strongly hampers support for European 
solidarity than opposition to EU membership and to EU deepening. A comparison of the regression 
coefficients shows that opposition towards EU membership, deepening and widening clearly have a 
stronger impact on support for member state solidarity than on transnational solidarity. Perhaps the 
former is very much seen as an EU-induced practice, whereas transnational solidarity is less perceived 
as an automatic consequence of European integration.  
Lastly, models 3a and 3b illustrate that public resistance to European solidarity is not simply an 
emanation of Euroscepticism, but relates to citizens’ substantive preferences regarding the EU’s agenda. 
As expected, citizens who advocate the European Commission giving a higher priority to social issues 
are much more in favour of member state solidarity and transnational solidarity. Prioritizing economic 




Moreover, citizens who strongly believe that economic policies should dominate the European agenda 
are significantly less willing to show solidarity with other EU member states or with EU citizens than 
those who give economic issues a lower priority. These effects are found on top of voters’ left-right 
self-placement, signalling that people genuinely have substantive positions towards the EU’s policy 
objectives. European solidarity is seen as a constitutive part of Social Europe, but not of economic 
European policy, which confirms hypotheses H4 and H5. It is remarkable that the effect of prioritizing 
social issues is much stronger for member state solidarity than for transnational solidarity. Possibly, EU 
transfers to less-developed and crisis-hit countries are considered as more effective policy instruments 
to achieve the EU’s social objectives. The allocated structural funds can improve the social development 
of complete regions, whereas transnational solidarity practices in the form of cross-border welfare rights 
are merely targeted at mobile citizens. Respondents might take into account that mobile EU citizens 
constitute only a small group within the European population and therefore may consider them as being 
less needy. Models 3a and 3b explain in total about 55 per cent of the variance in member state solidarity 
and 36 per cent of the variance in transnational solidarity.  
 




In contemporary debates about the development of the European Union, there is an apparent paradox 
between the call for a more Social Europe on the one hand and reservations about supranational 
solidarity on the other. This study empirically analyses whether public support for existing forms of 
European solidarity – member state solidarity and transnational solidarity – is in the first place an 
emanation of Eurosceptic attitudes, or is instead driven by EU agenda preferences.  
There are three main findings. First, Eurosceptic sentiments reduce support for member state and 




obstruct citizens’ willingness to share risks and resources with nations and citizens that are members of 
the EU. Citizens seem to recognize that being a member of the EU and the continued process of 
integration by means of widening and deepening will inherently require certain practices of EU-wide 
solidarity. In particular, opposition towards EU enlargement is strongly detrimental with regard to 
support for European solidarity. The public seems to understand clearly that enlargement of the EU has 
consequences for the boundaries of the community in which resources can be accessed or redistributed.  
The second major finding is that support for European solidarity is not just a matter of being in favour 
of or against European integration, but depends strongly on citizens’ preferences concerning the agenda-
setting of the EU. Prioritizing a Social Europe translates into higher support for member state and 
transnational solidarity. Advocates of a more social direction for the European project are thus 
genuinely more willing to redistribute resources to other member states and to open up the boundaries 
of their long-standing national solidarity systems to EU citizens. Conversely, prioritizing an Economic 
Europe is associated with lower levels of support for transfers to less-developed and crisis-hit countries 
and cross-border welfare rights. This finding implies that even though individuals are in favour of 
European integration, it is possible that they oppose European solidarity. EU agenda preferences are a 
crucial element in understanding support for specific EU policies whereas they remained underexposed 
in previous research. It should be noted that support for European solidarity is also strongly related to 
citizens’ European identity. This confirms previous research which shows that public support for 
European solidarity includes a strong cultural component (Kleider and Stoeckel, 2018). 
Third, we found differentiation in attitudinal patterns towards the two faces of EU-level solidarity. The 
finding that Euroscepticism has a relatively weaker impact on support for transnational solidarity may 
result from the fact that cross-border welfare rights are not only a prerogative of EU citizens. Non-EU 
citizens – or so-called third-country nationals – are under certain conditions also eligible to social 
benefits and services. Citizens may therefore perceive these benefits as part of a broader phenomenon 
of globalization, instead of the result of European decision-making. By contrast, financial transfers to 
less developed and crisis-hit countries are an exclusive characteristic of the EU’s policy, implying that 




integration. Furthermore, the preference for a more social EU agenda has a relatively weaker effect on 
support for transnational solidarity. In citizens’ minds, a more social agenda for the EU means helping 
other member states, and to a lesser extent sharing resources with mobile Europeans residing in their 
country. This discrepancy may be based on the reasoning that EU social objectives can be more 
effectively achieved by means of EU transfers, which can benefit complete regions, whereas cross-
border welfare rights are only advantageous to mobile EU citizens. The differentiation in the 
explanatory patterns of transnational and member state solidarity indicates that citizens distinguish 
between various components of Social Europe, confirming previous research (Baute et al., 2017). 
One of the limitations of this study relates to the measurement of support for cross-border welfare rights. 
This is operationalized by support for social rights for EU citizens residing in Belgium, whereas the 
principle of non-discrimination implies that Belgians are also granted access to social security when 
residing in other member states. The one-sided view on the beneficiaries of cross-border welfare rights 
in our survey has potentially resulted in recording lower support for transnational solidarity. A second 
limitation concerns the cross-sectional nature of the data, which implies that the causal direction behind 
this studied relationship cannot be established empirically. Although we argue that support for European 
integration influences preferences regarding European solidarity, the opposite causal argument can also 
be made, namely that attitudes towards European solidarity affect preferences regarding integration. 
Furthermore, given that this study is based on Belgian data, we are fully aware of the possibility that 
both member state solidarity and transnational solidarity can be perceived differently in other EU 
member states. On the one hand, Belgians may perceive member state and transnational solidarity as 
practices with little reciprocity. Apart from the revenues allocated to EU administration, Belgium is a 
net-contributor to the EU budget, attracts a high share of mobile EU citizens and has a strongly 
developed welfare state. In crisis-hit countries, support for financial help to other member states and 
cross-border welfare rights for EU citizens seeking employment elsewhere may be stronger. On the 
other hand, Belgians are on average relatively in favour of European integration (European Parliament, 




Accordingly, one can expect that Belgians’ pro-EU mindset spills over into above-average support for 
European solidarity. Cross-national research is needed to answer these remaining issues. 
Notwithstanding the limitations noted above, this study provides important insights for future policy 
development of the EU. Although it is argued that Europe needs to strengthen its social dimension to 
regain support from the public, our results nuance this suggestion. Citizens who oppose the very idea 
and principles of the EU are unlikely to become supportive of a European project with solidarity 
practices as constitutive policy elements. This indicates that heading towards a more social Union is not 
a silver bullet to counter hard Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, by strengthening solidarity practices 
between member states and between European citizens, soft Euroscepticism that is directed towards the 
agenda-setting of the EU – more specifically that the EU puts too little emphasis on social objectives – 
may be tempered. Furthermore, this study has implications for the legitimacy of the EU, as it indicates 
that citizens evaluate the EU in terms of what course it takes, on top of their overall evaluation of the 
project of European integration. General support for the EU remains an important underlying reason for 
voters’ willingness to share risks and resources with other member states and EU citizens. However, 
citizens have an ideological preference about what course the European project should take and this 
substantive position may play an increasingly important role in their support for continued European 
integration. Debate about the future of the EU should focus more on the policy directions of the union 
rather than presenting it as a unidimensional issue of more or less European integration. 
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Table 1:  Operationalization and Descriptive Statistics of Member State Solidarity and Transnational 
Solidarity 




Mean  S.D. Factor 
loadinga 
Member state solidarity      
Rich EU countries such as Belgium should 
always support other member states that 
experience serious economic difficulties 
33.04 30.37 2.94 0.94 .713 
Too much tax money is going from the 
prosperous EU countries to the poorer EU 
countries 
17.61 38.86 3.25 0.88 -.519 
The solidarity between the richer and poorer EU 
countries should not be broken 
11.00 52.39 3.48 0.85 .635 
Transnational solidarity      
EU citizens should receive the same social 
services as Belgians 
38.46 32.87 
 
2.89 1.07 .599 
In the allocation of social security benefits, 
Belgians should have priority over EU citizens 
27.92 45.98 3.25 1.07 -.709 
EU citizens should first have a job before they 
gain access to social services 
8.99 74.06 3.91 0.94 -.659 
Let’s support the poor in our country first, before 
we help the poor coming from other EU countries 
13.90 63.65 3.76 1.08 -.775 
Note: a Fully standardized parameters. Model fit: χ²=64.491; df=13; CFI=.970; TLI=.951; RMSEA=.053, N=1400. 




Table 2: Structural Equation Models for Member State Solidarity and Transnational Solidarity 













 β β Β β β β 
Age .083* -.042 .096** -.031 .040 -.048 
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Economic insecurity .015 -.146*** .059 -.122** .047 -.121** 
Migrant background  .097** .038 .129*** .059 .108** .055 
European identity .374*** .258*** .139*** .115** .119** .112** 
Left-right self-placement -.209*** -.239*** -.187*** -.221*** -.105** -.192*** 
EU membership 
A bad thing 
Neither good nor bad 
A good thing 





































A bad thing 
Neither good nor bad 
A good thing 
















EU social priorities     .368*** .147** 
EU economic priorities     -.150** -.128* 
       
Explained variance (R²) .273 .262 .465 .342 .552 .361 
CFI / TLI .937 / .911 .934 / .907 .929 / .901 
RMSEA .033 .030 .030 




Table A: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
Variable Mean (S.D.) / % N 
Age 51.70 (17.53) 1403 












Service class I (ref) 















Economic insecuritya 2.99 (0.92) 1401 
Migration background 13.51 1399 
European identity 2.92 (1.13) 1374 
EU membership of Belgium 
A good thing (ref) 
Neither a good nor a bad thing 







Reduce competences  
Maintain competences 






EU Enlargement to Eastern Europe 
A good thing (ref) 
Neither a good nor a bad thing  






Left-right self-placement 5.14 (2.19) 1364 
EU social prioritiesa 3.91 (0.67) 1379 
EU economic prioritiesa 4.15 (0.63) 1383 
Note: a Mean score of the measured variables of which the latent construct is specified.  
Source: BNES 2014.
Figure A: Perceived Priorities for the European Commission (%). 
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Figure B: Explanatory Model of Support for Member State Solidarity and Transnational Solidarity 
 
 
